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UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' 
ASSOCIATION and LARRY 
FIELDS, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-v-
STATE OF UTAH and SCOTT 
M. MATHESON, Governor 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
CASE NO. 16616 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS' 
NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants filed an action in the Third Judicial District 
Court, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief that a policy directive 
issued by the Governor of the State of Utah, prohibiting employees in 
the Division of Wildlife Resources from participating in an annual draw-
ing for once-in-a-life-time hunting permits, violated the employees' rights. 
The Third Judicial District Court granted respondents' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on all issues. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affinnation of the decision of the Third 
Judicial District Court, declaring the Governor's policy directive 
to be lawful and constitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents generally accept appellants' Statement of Facts, 
except respondents disagree that there are at least three less burden-
some alternative approaches, or that that aspect is even relevant to the 
present issues. 
Appellants fail to mention that in 1978, just prior to the 
Governor's policy directive being issued, three Division of Wildlife Re-
sources' employees who,submitted applications, were successful in obtain-
ing permits for the hunt. One employee obtained two pennits--one for the 
Big Horn sheep and one for the buffalo. Another employee received only 
a moose permit, and a third employee received only a Big Horn sheep per-
mit. That year, 3,181 applications (320 Big Horn sheep, 1261 buffalo, 1600 
moose) were received for the drawings. Out of the 3,181 applications, only 
20 sheep permits, 20 buffalo pennits, and 90 moose pennits would be issued, 
of which one employee obtained two permits; another employee received a 
moose permit, and a third employee received a Big Horn sheep permit. 
Appellants also fail to mention that, subsequent to the Third 
Judicial District Court's ruling in this matter, the attorneys for both par-
ties met in chambers with the Honorable HomerF. Wilkinson, District Judge, 
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regarding the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Wilkinson on 
July 18, 1979. The sum and substance of that conversation was 
that Judge Wilkinson ruled definitively for defendants-respondents 
in the matter, and plaintiffs' only remedy at that point, according 
to the Judge, was to seek an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE GOVERNOR HAS STATUTORY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE POLICY DI-
RECTIVE IN QUESTION. 
The Governor is statutorily and constitutionally authorized to 
adopt the policy in question. (See Exhibit A. attached hereto.) Utah 
Code Ann. Section 67-1-1 (1953), provides, in part: 
"In addition to those prescribed by the Constitu-
tion, the governor has the following powers and must 
perform the following duties: 
(1) He shall supervise the official conduct of all 
executive and ministerial officers." 
The mandatory language of the above-cited statute requires the Governor 
to supervise the conduct of all State employees. The manner in which 
the drawing for the big hunt permits is carried out is within the scope 
of "official conduct" of employees and_ is properly within the supervisory 
powers of the Governor over ministeria~icers. 
The Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 5, prescribes the 
duties of the Governor and provides, in part: 
-3-
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"The Governor shall see that the laws are faith-
fully executed; he shall transact all executive busi-
ness with the officers of the government, civil and 
military, and may require information in writing from 
the officers of the Executive Department, " 
The above-cited constitutional provision, requiring the Governor to 
see that the laws are faithfully executed, contains the inherent con-
stitutional authority to issue policy directives regarding the affairs 
of State government. (See, generally, 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Governor, Sections 
l and 4, at pages 932-935.) In the case of Kenny v. Byrne, 365 A.2d 211, 
144 N.J. Super. 243 (1976), the New Jersey Superior Court upheld an Execu-
tive Order of the Governor of New Jersey, requiring high echelon State em-
ployees to file financial disclosure state~ents. The Court in so holding 
stated: 
"Appellants' brief raises the question of the 
authority of the Governor to issue the executive 
order, contending that it is ultra vires and beyond 
his constitutional powers. This contention is mani-
festly without merit. 
"The Governor is vested with the executive power of 
the State. N.J. Const. ( 1947), Art. V, Section 1, par. 
1. As the head of the Executive Branch of government 
he has the duty and power to supervise all employees in 
each principal department of that branch. Ji., Art. V, 
Section 4, par. 2. Of necessity, this includes the in-
herent power to issue directives and orders by way of 
implementation in order to insure efficient and honest 
performance by those state employees within his jurisdic-
tion. Such power stems from the Governor's responsibility 
under the foregoing constitutional provisions as well as 
Art. V, Section l, par. 11, which requires that he 'take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed."' 355 A.2d 211, 
215. 
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There can be no question that the Governor has the legal authority 
to adopt said policy directive under both the statutes of the State 
and the Utah Constitution. See, generally, Note, Gubernatorial Ex-
ecutive Orders as Devices for Administrative Direction and Control, 
50 Iowa Law Review 78 (1964). 
The Utah Legislature has adopted the Utah Public Officers' 
and Employees' Ethics Act, set forth in Utah Code Ann. Section 67-16-1 (1953), 
~.. Said Act has application to these appellants who are the em-
ployees of the Division of Wildlife Resources, Department of Natural 
Resources, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 67-16-3 (9) (1953), de-
fining a "public employee." Utah Code Ann. Section 67-16-4 (3), pro-
vi des: 
No public officer or public employee shall: 
(3) Use or attempt to use his official 
position to secure special privileges 
or exemptions for himself or others." 
The Governor, being fearful of the appearance of impropriety if State em-
ployees participated in a drawing for the 20-to-90 permits to hunt big game 
animals, adopted a policy prohibiting Division employees and members of 
the Big Game Board from participating in the drawing. Said policy was 
adopted in the discretion of the Governor to further the best interests of the 
people of the State of Utah and to carry ~,the legislative mandate which 
would prohibit "actual or potential conflicts of interest." The Legislature 
-5-
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set forth in Utah Code Ann. Section 67-16-2 (1953): 
"Purpose of act.--The purpose of this act is to set 
forth standards of conduct for officers and employees 
of the state of Utah and its political subdivisions in 
areas where there are actual or potential conflicts of 
interest between their public duties and their private 
interest. In this manner the legislature intends to 
promote the public interest and strengthen the faith and 
confidence of the people of Utah in the integrity of 
their government. It does not intend to deny any pub-
1 ic officer or employee the opportunity available to all 
other citizens of the state to acquire private economic 
or other interests so long as this does not interfere with 
his full and faithful discharge of his public duties." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the above-cited Kenny v. Byrne, supra, the Court noted in dictum: 
" ... By accepting public employment an individual 
steps from the category of a purely private citizen to 
that of a public citizen. And in that transition he must 
of necessity subordinate his private rights to the extent 
that they may compete or conflict with the superior right 
of the public to achieve honest and efficient government." 
635 A.2d 211, 216. 
The Governor's policy, prohibiting Wildlife employees from participating 
in the big game drawing, was adopted to insure the greatest degree of pub· 
lie confidence in honest and efficient government and to avoid any appear-
ance of impropriety. To rule in appellants' favor that the Governor may 
not adopt such a policy would severely weaken the Governor's office and 
thwart his efforts to achieve the highest degree of integrity in govern-
ment as well as to instill public confidence in honest, efficient, and fair 
government. 
-6-
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POINT II 
THE GOVERNOR'S POLICY DIRECTIVE DOES NOT VIOLATE 
APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS AS 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES. 
The policy adopted by the Governor does not infringe upon 
any legally protected rights of appellants' or employees' of the Di-
vision of Wildlife Resources. The above-cited Kenny v. Byrne, supra, 
sets forth the general test regarding constitutional infringement of 
rights. The New Jersey Superior Court in finding no constitutional im-
pairments under the facts of that case, stated: 
"It is axiomatic that a classification in a statute 
or executive order does not offend the Equal Protection 
Clause if it conceivably has some reasonable basis to 
justify the same. Mere inequality or difference in treat-
ment does not suffice to support a charge of unconstitutional 
discrimination. See Dandridge v. Williams, 3g7 U.S. 471, 
90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970}; Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 
(1910). And a classification must be upheld under any reason-
able set of facts unless there is a showing of invidious dis-
crimination. Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457, 463, 77 S.Ct. 
1344, 1348, l L.Ed.2d 1485, 1490 (1957). 
"A classification is presumed to be constitutional and 
the one who attacks it has the burden of showing that it 
is arbitrary and without a reasonable basis to support it. 
David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 315, 212 A.2d 345 (1965). 
Plaintiffs have utterly failed to sustain this burden." 
365 A.2d 211, 219. 
Respondents particularly cite the leading case of Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., supra, which basically sets forth the "reasonable basis" 
test. The Court in that case held that: 
- 7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The rules by which this contention must be 
tested, as is shown by repeated decisions of this 
court, are these: 
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not take from the state the power 
to classify in the adoption of police laws, but 
admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discre-
tion in that regard and avoids what is done only 
when it is without any reasonable basis and, 
therefore, is purely arbitrary. 
2. The classification having some reasonable basis 
does not offend against the clause merely because 
it is not made with mathematical nicety or because 
in practice it results in some inequity. 
3. When a classification in such a law is called in 
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be 
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of 
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted 
must be assumed. 
4. One who assails the classification in such a law 
must carry the burden of showing that it does not 
rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially 
arbitrary." 220 U.S. 61, 78-79. 
The Utah cases, setting forth the "reasonable basis for classification" 
test are legion, and respondents would refer this Court to only a few of 
those cases: Slater v. Salt Lake City, et al., 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153 
(1949); State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, 117 A.L.R. 330 (1938). 
As contrasted with the "reasonable basis for classification" test 
is the so-called "strict scrutiny" test whenever a "fundamental interest" 
is involved or a "suspect" classification may exist. In those circumstances. 
the Court has concluded that any statutory classifications must be justified 
by showing a "compelling State interest" necessitating the classification, 
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and that the distinctions are necessary to further the purpose of 
the statute or regulation. The "strict scrutiny" cases, however, 
seem to be confined to the violation of fundamentally guaranteed 
rights. These cases traditionally deal with questions of race dis-
tinctions, right-to-vote, right of interstate travel and movement, 
right to constitutional protections in criminal processes, right of 
procreation, and other fundamentally guaranteed rights. The cases 
cited by appellants' seem to rely upon one facet of a "strict scrutiny" 
test, requiring that"no other less restrictive alternatives 11 be found 
available. Appellants extrapolate from this portion of the strict 
scrutiny test and suggest that the Governor must mandatorily exhaust 
all other available and possibly less restrictive alternatives before 
he may take any action regarding the conduct of Executive Branch em-
ployees. 
Respondents submit that the "strict scrutiny" test should not 
be applied, because no fundamentally guaranteed rights or interests are 
at stake. It is very difficult to precisely define "fundamental rights"--
yet those terms have conceptual meaning to most everyone hearing them. 
Respondents believe that the best definition, aside from listing a multi-
tude of specific examples from earlier decisions, is found in 16 Am.Jur.2d, 
Constitutional Law, at page 635, defining a "constitution": 
A constitution is not the beginning of a com-
munity, nor does it originate and create institutions of 
government. Instead, it assumes the existence of an 
-9-
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established system which is still to continue in 
force, and it is based on pre-existing rights, 
laws, and modes of thought. It has been aptly 
said that written constitutions sanctify and con-
firm great principles, but do not bring them into 
existence, and that a constitution is not the cause, 
but a consequence, of personal and political free-
dom." 
This implies that "fundamental rights" are those "pre-existing rights" 
which our constitutions and laws protect. These are the "certain un-
alienable Rights" referred to by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of 
Independence. The "rights" sought to be protected by appellants' to seek 
a hunting permit or "not to be excluded" by virtue of accepting public em-
ployment, under the facts of this case, do not rise to the level of funda-
mental rights. They are at best pennissive rights obtainable only under 
the State's licensing or franchising power. Hence, the "strict scrutiny" 
test should have no application. 
The cases cited by appellants' all deal with limitations on the 
political activities of public employees and, as such, are not in point. 
The "strict scrutiny" test is generally regarded as an exception to the 
traditional equal protection standards of requiring that a rational basis 
exist for statutory classifications, in order that the objects or purposes 
of the legislation may be obtained. Neither this Court nor any other court 
in similar situations has required that the governor of a state in issuing 
a policy directive regarding the conduct of public employees make an exten-
sive search for less restrictive alternatives, in order to control the ad-
ministrative affairs of State government. 
- 10-
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The~ case (421 P.2d 409 (1966)) is one of three 
cases from the State of California cited by appellants'. Those 
cases may be unique to the State of California, but, in any event, 
they all deal with the deprivation of political and First Amendment 
rights. This Court expressly rejected the application of the~ 
case in Salt Lake City Firefighters' Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City, 
22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239 (1979). In the Firefighters' case, the 
Court unanimously held that Salt Lake City had the power to require em-
ployees of the Fire Department to be residents of the city. Re-
spondents submit that seeking less restrictive alternatives is not 
the current law in the State of Utah and simply has no application 
to this fact situation. 
An examination of the class of employees affected by the policy 
of the Governor reflects a sound and reasonable basis for the Governor's 
decision. The affected employees are all those who may have direct con-
tact with those individuals conducting the drawing as well as employees 
having access to inside information regarding the whereabouts of the big 
game, the habits and movements of the animals, and access to special 
radio-sensing devices, which would aid in killing one of the big game 
animals. Said employees in appellants' class also are charged with the 
responsibi1ity of wildlife management and conservation within the State of 
Utah. They personally participate in the decision-making processes regard-
ing wildlife and are most likely to become involved in conflicts of interests, 
or other improper activities regarding the selection of 20-to-90 resident 
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permits for shooting the big game animals. 
In response to public criticism when 3,181 applications 
were received in 1978, of which only 20 sheep permits, 20 buffalo 
permits and 90 moose permits would be issued, with three employees 
re~eiving four permits, the Governor in his discretion decided that 
the public interest would best be served if all employees in Wildlife 
Resources were excluded from participation in the drawing. While no 
evidence exists that there was any impropriety on the part of the Divi-
sion of Wildlife Resources' employees, the Governor issued the directive 
to "clear up any misunderstanding that may arise about the propriety of 
Wildlife personnel participating in a drawing of this kind." 
Respondents submit that, in order to insure a strong, efficient, 
and honest government and create the greatest amount of public confidence 
in our government officials, appellants should be prohibited from parti-
cipating in the drawing. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent, Scott M. Matheson, Governor of the State of Utah, 
has statutory and constitutional authority to supervise the employees in 
the Executive Branch of government and to issue policy directives. Said 
policy statement in question is legally and lawfully adopted and has a sound, 
rational basis--that being to create public confidence in the honesty and 
integrity of State government. Said policy does not infringe upon any 
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constitutional or legally protected right of appellants' and does 
not discriminate under the Constitution. The District Court's de-
cision should be affirmed. 
DATED this 30th day o October, 1979. 
General 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
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EXHIBIT (A) 
STXTL OF UTAII 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 
SALT LAKE CITY 
84114 
NE\,JS 
November 7, 1978 
GOVER'.lOR SETS HUNTING POLICY 
FOR WILDLIFE RESOURCES PERSOc·ll-iEL 
Governor Scott M. Matheson today issued a policy which 
prohibits personnel from the Division of Wildlife. Resources, the 
mcm.!:iers of the Wildlife Resources Board and the Director of the 
Department of Natural Resources from participating in special 
com9uter draws for once-in-a-lifetime hunt permits. 
The special hunts that arc involved include the buffalo 
for which 20 resident permits were awarded this year, the 
piu-horn sheep hunt, for which 20 resident permits were offered 
~his year, and the moose hunt, for which 90 resident permits were 
tvJilable this year. In addition, there were two non-resident 
De::r.iit.s available for the buffalo hunt, three non-resident permits 
lor the big-horn sheep hunt and 10 non-resident permits for the 
tuoSe hunt. These non-resident permits cost $1,000 each. 
'1'!10.se huntcrs 1>"ho dra1-1 a permit for a parliculcir hunt arc 
.l1c11 .LJ1c.L L<J 1ulc for iul:ucc Jcc11vi.!l'JS foe l:l1c.tl liu11L, licncc the tcT.l!l 
u·1,ce:-.i.J1-L1-lifcL.ir·1c" hunls. 
The C0vc111or said that lie issued the directive "to clear: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
;.:;::.:S P.I:LEl'.SE 
;: 0 ·.-cmbcr 7, l.978 
page Two 
"Past dra11ings have been by computer and have been 
'toc:ally legitimate and proper," Governor Matheson said. "This 
\new policy will simply clarify who is eligible and who is ineligible 
for the dn:iv1ings." 
\ 
\ 
Contact: 
Margaret L. Wilde 
533-4552 
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